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Abstract—Consensus in decentralized systems that asyn-
chronously receive events and which are subject to Byzantine
faults is a common problem with many real-life applications.
Advances in decentralized systems, such as distributed ledger
(i.e., blockchain) technology, has only increased the importance
of finding performant and secure solutions to consensus of state
machine replication in decentralized systems.
YAC is a practical decentralized consensus algorithm, that
solves the problems of inefficient message passing and strong
leaders that occur in classical Byzantine fault tolerant consensus
algorithms. The algorithm is open source and currently is used to
provide Byzantine fault tolerant consensus for the Hyperledger
Iroha blockchain project. We provide proofs of safety and
liveness, as well as empirical results showing that our algorithm
can scale to dozens of validating peers.
Keywords—Blockchain, distributed consensus, distributed ledger
technology.
I. INTRODUCTION
Decentralized systems built around blockchain technol-
ogy have received much attention in recent years. Satoshi
Nakamoto [1] proposed the blockchain structure as a way for
timestamping sets of transactions without a central authority,
which he used to create a purely decentralized, digital cash.
The advantage of Nakamoto’s proposed method for decen-
tralized consensus (hereafter, Nakamoto consensus) is that
network participants are able to operate in an untrusted or
semi-trusted environment with a strong adversary assumption,
that is, in the presence of Byzantine faults among network
participants.
However, the proposed method of using Proof-of-Work [2]
is too resource intensive to be practical for many applications,
and the reliance on using Proof-of-Work to determine the “cor-
rect” blockchain out of several competing blockchain states,
leads to a lack of transaction finality that is caused by the prob-
abilistic nature of Proof-of-Work. Therefore, researchers have
given renewed attention to Byzantine fault tolerant algorithms
that function in a deterministic way under the assumption of
less than f faulty participants in the network consensus, due to
guarantees of transaction finality and computational efficiency.
While Byzantine fault tolerant consensus algorithms have a
long pedigree spanning several decades, a majority of previous
research has not focused on aspects peculiar to blockchain
technology, such as creating practical systems that are censor-
ship and politically resistant.
In this paper we present a novel, practical Byzantine fault
tolerant consensus algorithm that has a modular architecture
and simple implementation, called Yet Another Consensus.
Our implementation is open source and included in the Hy-
perledger Iroha blockchain platform1. Empirical results show
that our solution achieves both low latency for transactions as
well a reasonably high transaction throughput.
II. RELATED WORK
Decentralized systems are distributed systems that are
designed to have no central authority. Instead, the rules of
the system create a decentralized platform where data can
be agreed upon, through relying on some mechanism for
distributed consensus. Blockchain platforms use decentralized
consensus to maintain consistency across a distributed state
machine, which can be used to perform completely decentral-
ized payments [1] or even Turing complete computations [3],
realizing the creation of decentralized applications. Consensus
is the sine qua non of distributed systems [4], and has received
large amounts of attention recently from the industry [5]. It is
the role of consensus in blockchain systems to guarantee that
all non-faulty peers in a blockchain network perform the same
state machine updates in the same order. More than 30 years
of research in distributed systems has failed to create efficient,
internet-scale consensus [6].
Consensus [7] should guarantee liveness of the system,
security, and convergence (consistency) of data stored in the
ledger. Liveness means that the system should never stop and
should be able to recover from errors. Security means that non-
faulty peers should not accept false data. Consistency means
that all non-faulty peers should maintain or converge to the
same global ordering and state. Various consensus algorithms
have been proposed for different situations. Consensus algo-
rithms are often discussed in terms of some weak synchrony
assumption, and, as shown by Fisher et al. [8], no distributed
consensus algorithm can give a deterministic solution in a fully
asynchronous network.
Satoshi Nakamoto’s proposal [1] for decentralized consen-
sus uses the concept of an adaptable difficulty to create a
completely decentralized computational problem that is very
difficult to solve, yet trivial to verify the answer to. The dif-
ficulty of solving the Nakamoto Proofs-of-Work prevent Sybil
attacks on decentralized systems, as the required computations
are non-trivial. Other forms of Nakamoto consensus, such as
Proof-of-Stake [9] or Proof-of-Importance, use the concepts of
globally known, random numbers (such as block hashes and
public keys), along with finite values of non-zero cost, such
as account balances in Proof-of-Stake or account importance
scores in Proof-of-Importance, to determine what account has
the privilege of creating a block at a given time.
1https://github.com/hyperledger/iroha
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The practical Byzantine fault tolerance (PBFT) [10] con-
sensus algorithm, in the normal case, runs a three-phase
protocol: pre-prepare, prepare, and commit. A client sends
a request to one of the peers, who in turn broadcasts pre-
prepare messages to the other peers. In the prepare stage,
a prepare message is multicasted to all other nodes. When
a replica receives 2f prepare messages, it matches with the
pre-prepare message and multicasts a commit message. Once
the replica receives 2f + 1 commit messages, that match
the pre-prepare message, it changes the state to committed
and executes the message operation. Once the message is
executed, a reply is sent to the client. The main purpose of
a Byzantine fault tolerant consensus algorithm is to allow the
system to be able to survive and continue work despite some
of the machines exhibiting arbitrary faults. Although, PBFT
is a consensus algorithm with proven security and liveness
properties, it makes some assumptions that are not practical.
The network overhead during consensus round does not allow
scale the consensus protocol, limiting the throughput of the
whole system. It was shown [11] that PBFT can be attacked
by an adversary using a simple scheduling mechanism, halting
the consensus either completely, or forcing to wait long timeout
when leader is partitioned and unsynchronized.
Zyzzyva [12] extended PBFT, avoiding the expensive three-
phase commit protocol, utilizing fast track and actively in-
volving the client into the consensus process. In the best case
scenario, the client sends the request to the leader, who is
broadcasts it to all other replicas, and the client waits for
replies from all the peers. If the client receives 3f+1 replies, it
commits the transaction(s). In the case when the client receives
between 2f+1 to 3f messages, a regular consensus algorithm
is used. The client is a major player, who is responsible for
checking the integrity of replicas.
Hyperledger Fabric [13], [14] implements a pluggable
consensus on the order of transactions in the ordering service.
At the time of this writing, Hyperledger Fabric includes the
following consensus possibilities: a centralized server, crash
fault tolerance, and Byzantine fault tolerance (using BFT-
SMart [15]). The main difference between BFT-SMart and
PBFT is improved reliability and multicore computation for
the evaluation of signatures. The ordering cluster uses 3f + 1
nodes, each of which collects current envelopes and runs BFT-
Smart consensus. A transaction in Hyperledger Fabric consists
of the following steps: (1) a client creates a transaction and
sends it to all endorsing peers to execute the transaction against
the current state, (2) endorsing peers transmit the result of
the execution to the client, (3) the client collects all endorse-
ments, assembles them into the transaction and broadcasts
it to the ordering service, (4) the ordering service collects
the transactions and relays the transaction proposal to the
channel peers, (5) the channel peers validate the transactions
and apply valid transactions to the current local state. When
a transaction is validated by a peer, the result is sent to the
client. A transaction is considered final only when the client
receives enough transaction statuses from validating peers,
which complicates the process and client.
BChain [16] is a chain-based (as opposed to broadcast-
based) Byzantine fault tolerant consensus algorithm, which
uses information about the topological order of validators in
the network to determine the flow of messages sent to reach
consensus. BChain prioritizes efficiency of message passing
over latency of a transaction, because chain-based consensus
algorithms validate transactions serially and not in parallel.
Tendermint [17] requires locking a certain amount of
coins (stake), which cannot be spent during the duration of
mining. Unlike other algorithms where validators are all equal,
Tendermint validators are not required to be equal, with the
voting power being proportional to the amount of coins locked.
The consensus algorithm itself follows the PBFT three-phase
commit message pattern, but uses a gossip protocol for blocks
and transaction propagation. A validator commits a block only
if it has the block and votes for it from two-thirds of the total
voting power.
Algorand [18] is similar to Tendermint in that it has
stake-weighted voting by valdiators, but it is unique in that
it combines the stake values with a cryptographic sortition
function to choose the voting committee. This makes the con-
sensus algorithm more resistant to censorship than Tendermint.
However, designing stake-weighted consensus algorithms is
tricky [19], as this approach can open up new attack vectors.
Miller et al. [11] argued that current weak synchronous
consensus algorithms rely heavily on timing assumptions. They
showed that an adversary can attack PBFT, causing it to
either stop making any progress for consensus, or significantly
slowing the protocol.
The HoneyBadger consensus algorithm is an asynchronous
protocol, promising practical throughput. The authors make the
assumption that peers communicate with each other through
authenticated trusted channels, and consensus is done only
within a static community, without the possibility of extending
it. Although, our consensus algorithm, YAC, relies on the
timing assumption, we carefully evade problems of the PBFT
consensus algorithm, by using a dynamic peer list.
III. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
This section describes one round of YAC consensus exe-
cution with 4 peers (Alice, Bob, Clara, Deana), and follows
the steps to reach consensus for a block of transactions.
To explain the YAC algorithm, we will follow an example
of consensus along each each step of the pipeline. The pipeline
starts with each client sending its own transactions to the
ordering service (OS). It is the responsbility of the OS to
collect all transactions, order them, and create a block proposal
P1. The ordering service then shares proposal P1 with each
peer in the network.
Alice’s validation process
Alice is a ‘validator” who validates a proposal P1. Alice
tries to apply each transaction in the proposal to her local
state. A transaction is considered valid if it is not ill-formed
according to validation rules, and its application does not vio-
late rules about global state (e.g., no account can have negative
balances). The validation process is shown in Figure 1. Alice
creates a block from all valid transactions and calculates hash
of block H1.
Fig. 1. Validation process. Alice removes invalid transactions.
Order function and Alice’s vote
Alice now knows the proposal hash H1 and the initial
order of peers—[A,B,C,D]. Using hash H1 as an input for
the order function, Alice calculates the permutation for the
current round, with the result [C,D,A,B]. The first peer in
this round’s permutation list is Clara. Alice creates a vote and
propagates the vote to Clara. After sharing the vote, Alice
switches her local state to waiting for a commit message, up
until some time delay (Figure 2).
Fig. 2. Alice’s state. Alice sends the generated vote to Clara, the first peer.
The vote will be sent to Deana if no commit message is received after some
time delay.
State of Clara
Clara received Alice’s vote. Assume that Clara calculated
the same hash H1 from the validation process of proposal P1.
Clara propagates the vote to herself, since Clara calculates the
same order using the ordering function. Clara now has two
votes: Alice’s and Clara’s. But there are no votes yet from
Bob and Deana.
Deana shares the vote
Deana also computed hash H1 and sent her vote to Clara.
Now Clara has the required supermajority (> 2/3) of votes
(Figure 3). Clara broadcasts the commit message, with all the
received votes from the peers (Figure 4). Each peer, except
Bob, receives a commit message and adds signatures to the
block with the hash H1 and updates the local state.
Fig. 3. Clara’s state. Clara makes a commit message after receiving 3 votes.
Fig. 4. Commit broadcast. Clara shares the commit message with all peers.
Bob has connectivity issues and cannot receive the commit.
Fig. 5. Alice’s state after commit.
What about Bob?
Let’s assume that Bob has an unstable connection to
the network and he missed the previous and current rounds,
including Clara’s commit message. Bob did not propagate a
vote with hash H1 to Clara because he had an inconsistent
state, or is malicious. Bob computes hash H2, and gets a
different peer order [A,B,D,C] based on the hash H2. Bob
propagates his vote to Alice, and after Alice receives the vote,
and since Alice has already received the commit message from
Clara, she forwards Clara’s commit message to Bob directly.
Bob verifies the commit message from Alice and applies it.
He will now have the same state as others after the consensus
round.
IV. YAC
A. Preliminaries
Below we give an overview of the typical participants in
YAC.
Client: Each client is associated with one user who has a
public key registered in the blockchain system. In general, the
role of the client is to generate transactions and send them to
the ordering service. Client is also deploying smart contracts,
making queries to peers.
Peer: A peer is the network participant responsible for
validating and reaching agreement on transactions in proposals
and storing the negotiated transactions into blocks. Peers
maintain the complete transaction history in order to validate
proposals.
Ordering Service: The ordering service is the functional
module responsible for taking sets of transactions and creating
block proposals. A block proposal contains a list of transac-
tions for further agreement at peers. A proposal is a set of
transactions to be be validated and voted on by peers. Ordering
service is an abstract entity having multiple implementations.
We discuss more on it in section IV-C.
We provide the below definitions and general assumptions
to use throughout this paper.
Definition 1. Round r is a period of processing the r-th
proposal by a peer. The round starts at invoking processing a
proposal and finishes on committing a block. A round consists
of 2 logical phases: validation of transactions in the proposal
and agreement on the block derived from the proposal.
Definition 2. Honest peer is a peer that tries to sync with the
network, creates valid votes, commits and, never creates forks
for any round.
Assumption 1. We assume that Ordering Service is Byzan-
tine fault tolerant by itself and agreement on the order of
transactions is honest. Also, all valid transactions from clients
will eventually appear in some proposal. The Ordering Service
guarantees that a proposal will be delivered for all peers in
the network.
Assumption 2. We use the assumption of an asynchronous
environment [20]; each message that is successfully sent will
eventually received by the recipient.
Assumption 3. Hashes and digital signatures used have
cryptographic resistance and messages can’t be altered by
adversaries.
Assumption 4. YAC guarantees BFT replication for the data—
transactions in the block. However, different honest peers may
apply different subsets of signatures for a block. This is a valid
situation because each honest peer has proof of supermajority
voting for a committed block.
B. Overview
For simplicity of the general pipeline explanation, we make
several assumptions. First, we assume the client is known by
the peers, and the client has a list of known peers to interact
with. Second, client has its own keys stored securely on a
device. Third, the client has permissions to execute a certain
subset of commands/smart contracts on the blockchain (e.g.,
to transact). The general network pipeline of one round in
a blockchain system with YAC can be described with the
following steps:
1. A client forms a transaction with commands and signs
it with their private key.
2. The client sends the transaction to a peer. The peer
receives the transaction, performs stateless validation
(i.e., verifies that it is not malformed), and relays it
to the OS.
3. The OS generates a proposal and sends it to the peers.
The proposal contains an ordered list of transactions
that will be potentially added to the blockchain in this
round.
4. The proposal is sent to the voting peers. Peers enter
the collaboration phase, during which they exchange
votes across the network and decide on a block. More
details on the collaboration phase are provided in
Section V.
5. The peer commits the block to their local block store.
C. Ordering phase
The OS collects transactions to include into a new proposal.
A proposal is generated after the OS has collected some
number of transactions, or after a time limit. The OS then
broadcasts the proposal to all peers after the proposal is
created.
The ordering service is an abstract concept that can have
many possible implementations. The OS can be considered as
one entity that is defined upon network creation. The ordering
phase can be expressed using three steps: 1) clients share
transactions with the ordering service, 2) the OS makes a
proposal by combining received transactions, 3) the OS then
shares the proposal with all validating peers.
Fig. 6. Ordering phase: 1. Clients send transactions to a peer with the
ordering service; 2. the ordering service makes a proposal; 3. the ordering
service shares the proposal with all peers.
V. COLLABORATION PHASE
A peer calculates a verified proposal after it receives a
proposal from the ordering service. A verified proposal is a
subset of transactions from the proposal, defined to be valid
by the peer. The block, that is generated by a peer, consists of
a proposal hash, transactions from the verified proposal, and
additional metadata required for cryptographic validation of
the chain.
The proposal hash defines a unique proposal for each round
of collaboration. The block hash represents an intention of the
peer to store a subset of transactions in the ledger. These hashes
are required because different peers can calculate different
blocks from the same proposal. A vote message contains the
pair of hashes, and a signature, which is used to authenticate
a peer when a message is received from the network.
A. Permutation function
When a peer votes for a block hash, it generates an order
over the validating peers for the current round. The order is a
permutation of peers that is required to propagate the vote in
the network.
The order is generated by a function that takes the block
hash and an initial list of peers as parameters. The order
function is required to be pure and return uniformly distributed
lists.
B. Vote step
Vote messages for a proposal are sent to each peer in
the specified order. A delay exists between each propagation.
The process repeats until a valid commit or reject message
is received from the network. One iteration of this process is
called a vote step. The process of propagation starts from the
first peer after propagation to last peer in the order of validating
peers.
Fig. 7. Vote step. The vote message is sent to the first peer in the list
(solid line), and then is sent to the next peer (dashed line), because of timer
expiration in the vote step.
C. Commit
Supermajority is defined to be a number greater than two
thirds of all peers in the network. A commit message is a set of
votes for one block hash, signed by a supermajority of peers.
When some peer has collected a supermajority of votes for
one hash, it broadcasts the commit message.
D. Reject
A reject message is a set of votes that proves that peers
will not collect a supermajority of votes for any block hash.
This can be defined as if the sum of missing votes and votes
for the most frequent block hash is less than the supermajority
of the nodes. A peer broadcasts the reject message in the same
way as the commit message.
It is possible that a peer can vote for a proposal hash that
was already committed. In this case, it will receive the commit
message from the peer that received the vote. This process is
called commit forwarding.
VI. PROOF OF BYZANTINE FAULT TOLERANCE
In order to prove the BFT property of the consensus
algorithm, we must prove the safety and liveness of the
Fig. 8. Reject. Green votes have been collected by a validating peer, gray
votes are missing from validating peers.
algorithm. The safety property is separated in two parts. First,
it should be impossible to reach consensus for different hashes
for the same proposal on honest peers. Second, there should
be time bounds (in terms of rounds) for honest peers in the
network. The liveness property provides a guarantee for a valid
client’s transaction to appear in some consensus round. Proof
of liveness is done by construction.
Assumption 5. The proof doesn’t cover the reject case. If
a reject case is detected at any peer it means that the BFT
environment is broken, so this situation violates the BFT
assumption.
Lemma 1. Safety: the output of consensus for all honest peers
will eventually be the same.
Proof: We have to proof that all honest peers in the
network eventually will be in the same state. We can prove
this by separating into two parts:
a) Impossible to achieve different states S1 and S2 for
round r for honest peers.
b) If the maximum round in the network is r + 1, then
an honest peer may only be in rounds r and r + 1.
Prove a) by contradiction. Assume that peers P1 and P2
are honest and they commit different hashes H1 and H2
respectively. The commit message of P1 contains at least 2f+1
votes by commit message definition V-C. The same situation
applies for peer P2: the commit message contains at least
2f + 1 votes for H2. But this situation is impossible because
the hash and cryptography note 3 and our assumptions of the
BFT environment: only f out of 3f + 1 peers may generate
non-unique votes for a different hash, but we have at least
2f + 1 peers are not honest.
Proving b) by the definition. First, we need to understand
how different peers appear in different rounds. When peer Pi
multicasts a commit message, it changes its own state: Pi :
r → r + 1. And peer Pi propagates a commit message to Pj ,
where i 6= j. Pj will receive the commit by asynchronous
assumption, but we do not know when. So, Pi and Pj will
stay in different rounds: r + 1 and r. Now we have to show
if peer P that is in round less then r, where someone is in
round r+ 1, is faulty peer. If someone is in round r+ 1, that
means by definition that the block from round r has already
committed. So, peer P did not vote for the block in round r
because the commit message with a supermajority of votes has
committed. Thus, in round r+1 it does not have a valid state
for voting.
Lemma 2. Liveness: all correct transactions will be eventually
committed.
Proof: By the assumption of the Ordering Service (As-
sumption 1), we guarantee that all valid clients’ transactions
will appear in some proposal and proposals will be received
by all honest peers in the network.
Assume peer Psource achieves a supermajority of votes and
multicasts a commit message to the network. It follows that
two situations that may happen on multicast: a commit will be
received by peer Ptarget, or not.
Commit has been received by Ptarget: liveness is achieved
for the target peer because of the asynchronous environment.
Commit has not been received by Ptarget from Psource.
This situation happens when Psource is faulty and shut down
in the process of committing, or is malicious and does not
send it. Peer Ptarget is conducting the vote step while it has
not received the commit message: vote from Ptarget is received
by honest peer Phonest. These are the possible situations:
1. Phonest has not committed anything. In this case
Ptarget will repeat the vote step. Eventually some
peer will achieve a supermajority of votes because of
asynchronous and BFT environment assumptions.
2. Phonest has reached a number of votes for multicast-
ing a commit message. This is the same case as with
multicast of Psource. This case is the same as the ini-
tial assumption with Psource peer, where Psource :=
Phonest. Definition of honest peers also guarantee that
the commit will be delivered to Ptarget.
3. Phonest has already committed. It directly propagates
a commit message to Ptarget. However, for some
reason, Ptarget did not receive the commit message
on multicast. This situation may happen because a
supermajority subset already voted for the block and
Ptarget was not available due to interruptions in the
network connection.
Each case of YAC leads to transactions of clients appearing
in a proposal and honest peers making an agreement on them.
VII. EXPERIMENTS
This section describes experiments conducted over the Yet
Another Consensus implementation in Hyperledger Iroha, an
open-source, distributed ledger technology platform written in
C++. The codebase used was the latest development branch,
after the release of version 1.0 alpha. The system configuration
used for the testing is described in the system overview section
below, and details of each experiment are enclosed in the
corresponding sections.
A. System overview
For each experiment, 4 virtual private servers (VPS) were
used with similar configuration and different geographic lo-
cations. Servers were provisioned so that two machines were
located in Tokyo, Japan, a single server was in Singapore, and
another one was in Los Angeles, USA. Each Hyperleder Iroha
peer was deployed in a docker environment, having a docker
image created from the development branch at aspecified com-
mit2, and a PostgreSQL 9.5 docker container for each Iroha
docker container. Logs were collected from each container,
using Elasticsearch, Logstash, and Kibana stack.
The VPS service provider used was Vultr [21]. Each
docker environment at the VPS servers had the following
configuration:
• Kernel Version: 4.4.0-109-generic
• Operating System: Ubuntu 16.04.3 LTS
• Architecture: x86 64
• CPUs: 4
• Total Memory: 7.796GiB
Ansible Playbook was used to deploy an arbitrary number
of Iroha peers, varying from 4 peers, up to 64.
B. Vote step delay
The purpose of this experiment was to deduce an optimal
value for the vote step delay, which is the period of time
for each peer to decide on the proposal to become the next
block in the chain by voting. We tested several values in
different network configurations to discover the relationship
between the number of peers in the network, vote step delay
parameter, and the number of proposals processed per second
(system throughput). Figure 9 shows the median value of
system throughput based on ten trials.
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Fig. 9. Proposal throughput for varying vote step delay
The experiment shows that in a small network size con-
figuration (4 peers), small vote delay values (1 millisecond)
are effective to increase the throughput. However, for bigger
21adfd0
values of network size (from 16 to 64 peers), small vote delays
impose limitations on the ability of peers to reach consensus
on a proposal and thus are not improving the throughput of the
system. The number of peers that exhibited unstable behavior
across the 10 trials in the experiments are displayed in Table I.
TABLE I. NUMBER OF FAULTY NODES IN CONDUCTED EXPERIMENTS
Vote step delay, Network size
milliseconds 4 16 28 64
1 0 1 3 15
20 0 0 0 10
100 0 0 0 4
200 0 0 0 3
500 0 0 0 0
1000 0 0 1 2
2500 0 0 0 0
3500 0 1 0 0
5000 0 0 1 1
VIII. DISCUSSION
To propagate data between validating peers in the network
takes time, thus a vote step delay that is too short can cause
peers to time out and fail consensus. Our results show that a
general trend is that the smallest value (1ms) of vote delay
in the system shows the best results for throughput (number
of proposals per second), however, the chance of consensus
being reached in the network is less compared to larger vote
step delay values. Ideally, each network configuration should
be tested before the peers agree and use the same value for
vote step delays in order to find a peak where the network of
peers is more likely to reach consensus and yet the throughput
does not start to degrade. In our experiments such extreme
points were:
• 4 nodes – 1 millisecond
• 16 nodes – 1 millisecond
• 28 nodes – 1 millisecond
• 64 nodes – 20 milliseconds
Thus it is important to tailor the vote step delay to match
the number of validating peers in the network.
IX. CONCLUSION
We presented YAC, a novel Byzantine fault tolerant con-
sensus algorithm for blockchain systems. Using voting on
block proposals, YAC is able to guarantee safety and liveness
for transaction processing, given that not more than f faulty
validating peers are present out of at least 3f + 1 peers on
the network. This paper provides an overall description of the
algorithm execution in different cases. Also, we followed the
steps of a YAC execution example where peers have different
states. Empirical results using the open source implementation
of YAC in Hyperledger Iroha show that the algorithm can scale
to dozens of validating peers, however the delay at the vote
step must be adjusted for the number of validating peers in
order to reduce exhibited faults by peers.
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